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‘The Hobbit Dispute’: 
Organizing through transnational alliances 
 
 






It is now seen as a common sense strategy for trade unions to organise at a transnational level, in 
order to attempt to counter the global nature of capital in the neo-liberal political economy. Events 
surrounding the controversy over the location of the production of the two Hobbit movies in New 
Zealand in 2010 highlight how the forces of labour remain embedded in the nation state. This 
location of labour within the institutions, history and culture of particular nations, combined with a 
non-neutral state actor, can negate the power of transnational alliances, leaving labour powerless 
against threats of capital flight. This paper will seek to explore the transnational strategy adopted by 
the actors’ Global Union Federation (GUF), the International Federation of Actors (FIA). In doing 
so, it will use the framework for analysis of such alliances suggested by Brookes (2013). It will also 
attempt to explain how a brief two- week period in New Zealand (NZ) industrial relations has come 
to be seen as a failure of trade unionism and global action, even while the objective of that action, 
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It is now seen as common sense that, as the processes of globalisation have freed capital from 
national boundaries, so too should labour organise at a global level. Such global organising, it is 
hoped, should allow labour to continue to act as a counterweight to the power of capital, on the 
same global level. This is posited as one of many strategies to combat the 'crisis in trade unionism'. 
The events surrounding the Hobbit controversy of October 2010 can, however, be seen as an 
example of how industrial relations, and in particular the forces of labour, remain embedded in the 
nation state. This location of labour within the institutions, history and culture of particular 
nations, combined with a non-neutral state actor, can negate the power of transnational alliances, 
leaving labour powerless against threats of capital flight. This paper will seek to explore the 
transnational strategy adopted by the actors’ Global Union Federation (GUF), the International 
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Federation of Actors (FIA). In doing so, it will use the framework for analysis of such alliances 
suggested by Brookes (2013). It will also attempt to explain how a brief two- week period in New 
Zealand (NZ) industrial relations has come to be seen as a failure of trade unionism and global 
action, even while the objective of that action, a start to collective bargaining, was achieved.  
First, I will present an overview of the dispute, followed by a discussion of the global crisis in 
trade unionism, with a summary of the historical trajectory of industrial relations in NZ and the 
current role of ideology in NZ society. In summing up this paper will look at the determining factors 
in the outcome of the dispute, and will, in keeping with the overall objective of this special issue, 
consider whether there are any lessons for future transnational allliances to be learned.  
 
 
The Background to the Dispute 
The film industry is an important part of NZ culture and patriotic pride, particularly since 
the successes of the Lord of the Rings trilogy and of Peter Jackson and the Weta Workshops in 
gaining international recognition for their work. Indeed, it has been commented that ‘[t]here is a 
sense that Sir Peter has been elevated to a status unachieved by most successful business people... 
beyond reproach and in some way untouchable’ (Haworth, 2012: 102). NZ governments have 
invested heavily in attracting film and television project finance since the mid-1990s and government 
policy has been turned toward film-making as a potentially significant contributor to export earnings 
since that time. According to McAndrew and Risak, ‘[t]hese films are seen as contributing 
temporarily to the NZ economy during production, but also carrying longer term spinoff benefits in, 
for example, the tourism sector’ (McAndrew & Risak, 2012: 61). That said, the subsidies, through 
tax concessions granted to film and TV production remain controversial, and it is entirely up for 
debate whether the amount of investment from successive governments has had a worthwhile return 
for the economy generally. A 2009 Price Waterhouse Coopers study concluded that the industry 
contributed just over one per cent to NZ GDP in 2008, with total employment created in 2008 at 
almost 22,000 full time equivalents (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2009) out of a total reported 
labour force of 2,293,000.1 
The issue which propelled the controversy was an attempt by the NZ actors’ union (NZ 
Equity) to commence negotiation with the main producers’ association, the Screen Production and 
Development Association (SPADA), over an update to previously negotiated minimum contract 
terms and conditions for work on screen productions in NZ. The previously negotiated minumum 
agreement, termed ‘The Pink Book’, had been concluded in 2005. (There was also an agreement as 
to minimum terms and conditions for the industry’s technicians – ‘the Blue Book’.) NZ Actors' 
Equity is an autonomous part of the Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance (MEAA). This is an 
Australian trade union, which was (according to their website) requested by NZ actors in 2006 to 
set up an office in NZ. According to Helen Kelly, President of the Council of Trade Unions (CTU – 
NZ’s peak trade union body), the membership of NZ Equity at April 2011 was around 600 (Kelly, 
2011).  
While attempts to initiate bargaining had been ongoing since 2009, an opportunity for 
Equity to have some leverage over the film industry in NZ, and to garner international support, 
came when the notices for The Hobbit production began to be sent out to agents around the world 
in May 2010. In June 2010, having discussed the situation surrounding the refusal of SPADA to 
agree to bargaining, the executive of the FIA issued a ‘Do not sign’ notice encouraging affiliates to 
dissuade their members from agreeing to appear in The Hobbit at that time. This ‘grey list’ was not 
made public, but a letter was sent to the local production company Three Foot Six to advise them 
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of the FIA's position in August 2010. Their response was that the production company could not 
negotiate with the union, as they were negotiating on behalf of self-employed contractors, and that 
such collective bargaining was illegal under NZ competition laws. Further discussions were on-going, 
but Peter Jackson, who was not the film’s producer, and not a party to the dispute, released a 
statement on 27 September 2010, in which he condemned the union as an ‘Australian bully’ looking 
to wreck the NZ film industry to the benefit of the Australian industry.2 He also put out notice of 
the possibility of the film being moved overseas (in this case to ‘Eastern Europe’). To put Jackson’s 
description of the union being Australian into context, there is a long history of cultural and sporting 
rivalries between the two countries. Being close geographically and also culturally, having been 
colonised by the British at similar times, the two countries also have a history of social and 
economic co-operation. They agreed a series of agreements in 1983 known as ‘Closer Economic 
Relations’, which spans a range of areas, including free trade in most goods, market harmonisation in 
services and capital, mutual recognition of many standards and a creation of an open labour market 
(Patman, 2006). Over the past decade, however, the Australian ownership of capital (for example 
the majority of the banks in NZ are Australian owned), together with the higher wages available in 
Australia have made the rivalry a political issue – so much so that at both the 2008 and 2011 general 
elections the number of New Zealanders leaving the country to permanently live and work in 
Australia were election issues. These figures were only made worse after the Canterbury earthquakes 
of 2010 and 2011. The number of New Zealand born citizens who departed for Australia in 2002 
was 17,619. The number rose until in 2008 it reached 35,967. While there was a drop back to 
23,117 in 2009 and 26,144 in 2010, 37,423 and 39,409 migrated to Australia in 2011 and 2012.3 
This is in the context of an estimated total population in 2002 of 3.9 million, rising to 4.4 million in 
2012.  
Given the esteem in which Jackson is held by the NZ public, public opinion was very much 
informed by ‘...the xenophobic tone of Sir Peter and the Government’. As a result ‘[t]he legitimacy 
of international union involvement when dealing with Warner Bros and MGM and their NZ nexus 
was substantially lost in popular coverage’ (Haworth, 2012: 107). 
Jackson's statement led to the peak union body, (CTU) becoming involved in the dispute 
for the first time, on 28 September 2010. Further this also prompted the Government to get 
involved in what was to become tripartite negotiations. There were various meetings held involving 
SPADA, the CTU, NZ Equity, and the Economic Development Minister, Gerry Brownlee, between 
this date and 17 October 2010, at which time an agreement was reached whereby SPADA would 
enter negotiations with NZ Equity at a later date, and the FIA would remove the ‘do not sign’ order. 
While this would appear to be a successful end to a transnational industrial action to initiate 
collective bargaining between NZ Equity and SPADA, this was not the end of the saga. Indeed, it 
was only at this point, after the dispute was settled, that the decision of Warner Brothers executives, 
as the overall investors and controllers of the production, to travel to NZ to discuss the industrial 
relations climate became an issue.  
 
 
Ongoing Union Activities  
Quite separately, and as part of an ongoing public awareness campaign run by the CTU, a 
national day of action had been arranged for 20 October 2010 ‘to express [unions’] wish to see fairer 
workplaces in New Zealand and their frustration with the National Government’s proposed 
employment law changes.’ The Employment Relations Amendment Bill 2010 included the removal 
of any rights to personal grievances for unfair dismissal within the first 90 days of employment; 
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changes to sick leave but particularly the right of the employer to require a medical certificate on the 
first day of sickness; restrictions on union access to workplaces; and changes to the Holidays Act. 
This soon after became the Employment Relations Amendment Act 2010.  
These demonstrations took place across the country at noon. On the same day, workers in 
the film production industry in Wellington were contacted and invited to a meeting at the Weta 
Workshops, at which those workers were told that the dispute was not settled, the boycott 
continued and that consequently production of The Hobbit was moving offshore. A leaflet which was 
handed out at that meeting specifically states that there continues to be a ‘boycott’ of the film, that 
this is an Australian union’s boycott and that the film industry in NZ will not survive. While the 
CTU, MEAA, Actors Equity and the US Screen Actors’ Guild (SAG) all then issued statements 
confirming that the ‘Do not work’ order had been rescinded, and that this had been known to 
everyone involved, the ongoing narrative now turned to the Warner Brothers executives planned 
travel to NZ to meet with the Government the following week, about the ‘uncertainty’ surrounding 
filming in NZ, and the status of the actors as independent contractors.  
The relevant employment law case here, which happened to have involved one of Jackson’s 
companies, Bryson v Three Foot Six Ltd., was now at the forefront of the discussions, along with the 
alleged ‘ongoing’ boycott.4 The Bryson case had confirmed the orthodox common law approach to 
determining whether a contract is one of employment or between a contractor and a principal. This 
approach involves looking not only at the written contract and how it is labelled, but primarily at 
the substance of the relationship between the principal and the contractor, including, amongst 
others, the amount of flexibility in hours and work organisation, the supply of tools by the principal 
or the contractor, and the presence of on the job training. In this case, the Employment Court, in a 
judgment later confirmed by the Supreme Court, found that notwithstanding that it might be 
common practice in this industry for workers to be engaged as self-employed contractors, looking at 
the whole circumstances of Bryson's relationship with Three Foot Six Ltd. showed that this was a 
relationship better characterised as employer/employee. This finding against Three Foot Six Limited 
meant that they were obliged to pay Mr. Bryson redundancy pay for having terminated his contract.  
No-one involved in the Actors Equity campaign had suggested that they would look to be 
employed rather than engaged as independent contractors. Indeed if they had wanted to be engaged 
as employees, they would not have had to bargain for many of the minimum terms that they were 
looking for – payment for delays to production and sick pay for example – as these would be 
included in their contract of employment under NZ employment law. The actors who are engaged 
in film production around the world through union-negotiated contracts, such as those of SAG, are 
independent contractors, not employees, and no-one had suggested at any point in the ongoing NZ 
dispute that a change would be made to this common industry practice. 
Whether the actors, as independent contractors, were able to collectively bargain under 
prevailing NZ law is still open to interpretation and discussion. However, a way forward which 




The Pay Off 
Warner Brothers’ executives came to NZ in the last week of October 2010, where they met 
with the Government over two days. The result of this meeting, announced on 28 October, was 
that the filming of The Hobbit and its sequel would take place, after all, in NZ. But these 
negotiations had seen the Government make substantial concessions to Warner Brothers.  
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The Government’s concessions were twofold. First, an amendment to the ERA 2000 was 
announced on 28 October, and was passed into law on 29 October 2010 under a process called 
‘urgency’ (meant for emergencies, by which a piece of legislation can be passed through all the 
Parliamentary stages without any public consultation, Committee stages, or any regulatory impact 
statement).  
The Employment Relations (Film Production Work) Amendment Act 2010 inserts into the 
definition of ‘employee’ within ERA s6(1) that this definition: 
 
(d) excludes, in relation to a film production, any of the following persons: 
• ‘(i) a person engaged in film production work as an actor, voice-over actor, stand-in, 
 body double, stunt performer, extra, singer, musician, dancer, or entertainer: 
•  (ii) a person engaged in film production work in any other capacity.’  5 
 
This entirely changes the law which was set out in the Bryson case, and means that workers 
in the film production industry will no longer be regarded as employees, no matter the reality of the 
relationship, if their contract deems them to be contractors.  
The further financial concession to retain the production in NZ was that the Government 
would offset the films' marketing costs by US$10 million (NZ$13.4 million) and pay up to US$7.5 
million (NZ$10 million) in extra tax breaks for each of the two movies, subject to their success. 6 
On 17 October 2010 the successful conclusion of transnational labour action should have 
been celebrated by the transnational alliance of actors’ unions through the FIA. What happened, in 
the short period from 18 October to 29 October, to turn this around to such an extent that Warner 
Brothers executives were leaving a country with the film and TV production labour market 
effectively de-regulated, and with further NZ taxpayers’ funds in their pockets? In an attempt to 
answer this I will now look at the changing nature of trade unionism and its legitimate role in 
society, before providing a brief overview of NZ industrial relations, and the prevailing ideology in 
the country. I will then analyse the actions of the unions using Brookes’ framework, and conclude by 
commenting on the actions of the major investors and the NZ Government.  
 
 
Trade Unions in the Neoliberal Global Political Economy  
Trade unions have played important roles in the political economy of industrialised capitalist 
economies: providing a measure of democracy in the workplace through collective voice; providing a 
countervailing measure to the socio-economic power of capital, and; acting as a ‘sword of justice’ by 
fighting for the vulnerable in society and, through this, articulating values which provide aspirations 
for a different society (Gumbrell-McCormick & Hyman, 2013). Trade unions and trade unionism, 
however, are under serious pressure in most industrialised countries. This is what has been referred 
to as the ‘crisis in trade unionism’.  
There has been much written about this crisis in trade unionism globally over the past two 
decades. The crisis can be summarised as consisting of a decline in membership and density, together 
with a loss of political influence and social standing for trade unions (Gumbrell-McCormick & 
Hyman, 2013: 29, Dufour & Hege, 2010). There has also been a concomitant amount of 
commentary and debate about the various strategies being deployed to combat this crisis, or in other 
words, to renew trade unionism globally. The crisis has been caused by changes in the political 
economies of the industrially developed nations, both within nations, and through the processes of 
globalisation. In this respect the freeing up of capital markets, allowing the swift movement of 
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capital around the globe, has left labour unions, as national level actors, in competition with each 
other for the capital investment which brings, or keeps, jobs.  
While trade union membership and density remains static across much of the OECD, the 
trend appears towards membership erosion. Add to this the heterogeneous nature of those workers 
choosing to remain outwith unions and it may be fair to argue that there is more at stake than a 
need to boost recruitment, but rather that we are dealing with changes in the societal status of these 
collective organisations. This may be described as a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ (Dufour & Hege, 2010: 
366). Indeed, McKay & Moore (2009) reported that a number of the long-standing activists 
engaged in their focus group research identified a reduction in the legitimacy of the union in the 
workplace, and placed this in the context of wider political change (Moore, 2011: 40). This loss of 
legitimacy and wider political, ideological change in NZ can be argued to be the major contributors 
to the apparent failure of the transnational alliance in The Hobbit case. Since the Fourth Labour 
Government of 1984-1990, New Zealand ‘has been notable for a remarkable programme of radical 
economic reforms’ (Dalziel, 2006: 62). As discussed further below in the context of industrial 
relations, this is marked by a move towards a neo-liberal consensus with a putatively small, but 
neutral, role for government and liberal markets in all areas. Most of the Government’s trading arms 
were privatised, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand was made independent from ministerial 
intervention (Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act, 1989) and markets were opened up to foreign 
investment (Daziel, 2006: 62). 
 
 
Local vs Global Analysis  
This was a purely local dispute, but was to become of international interest due to its 
location within the global film production industry, and the strategic decision to bring the industrial 
action from the local, largely powerless base to a stronger, global scale through the work of the 
industry GUF – the FIA.  
International organisations of trade unions are not new, nor unique to the modern period of 
globalisation, and the original international organisations emerged simultaneously with the major 
national confederations, at the end of the 19th century (Gumbrell-McCormick & Hyman, 2013: 
158). Between 1889 and 1914, thirty-three International Trade Secretariats (ITS) were formed 
(Hensman, 2011: 280). Over the past century there have been different configurations of such 
international organisations, but most have been industry based, international associations to which 
national trade unions or trade union confederations affiliate. The successors to the ITS, Global 
Union Federations (GUFs), therefore do not have direct, individual members, but are ‘organisations 
of organisations’ (Gumbrell-McCormick & Hyman, 2013: 161). This has implications for their 
ability to act; most trade union action depends on the mobilisation of their members by their 
unions, and the willingness of the membership to take part in that action. Therefore the ability of a 
GUF to act is dependent on their affiliates both agreeing with the action, urging their own members 
to act and having the power to mobilise the actions by their own members. Further, the 
heterogenous nature of the industrial relations systems within which the affiliates find themselves 
adds further to the issues surrounding global solidarity as envisioned through such transnational 
organisations.  
While the processes of globalisation have been said to remove the legitimacy of analysing the 
actions of labour or capital at a national level, there do remain fundamental considerations about 
union activities at a national level. Indeed, Meardi (2011 in Gumbrell-McCormick & Hyman, 
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2013) has pointed out ‘if nations are not the beginning and the end of culture, they are not dead or 
irrelevant either… Law, political traditions and language are particularly important factors that 
operate mostly at the national level.’ As Gumbrell-McCormick & Hyman (2013) have argued, it is 
impossible to understand unions in isolation as they are embedded, at a national level, in four main 
types of relationship: with their own members and constituents; with employers; with governments; 
and with ‘civil society’ or ‘public opinion’. Each union, or national union movement, has a different 
relationship with each of these and so the relevant strategies and tactics adopted by unions will 
depend upon reflection and consideration of what relationships currently exist and which of those 
can, and should, be influenced to change in light of changing ideologies.  
The fourth relationship identified by Gumbrell-McCcormick & Hyman, and arguably the 
most important where an ideological shift has led to a lack of legitimacy, is that with ‘civil society’ 
or ‘public opinion’. The reactions in the media to the disputes over casualisation of work at Ports of 
Auckland and around this Hobbit dispute, culminating in the passing of the Employment Relations 
(Film Production) Amendment Act 2010, have been suggested by Bogg et al. (2013: 5-6) as evidence 
of the emergence of (at least) three ideological shifts in NZ society: the emergence of a neoliberal 
‘deregulatory’ ideology; a ‘third way’ competitiveness ideology; and a ‘liberal neutrality’ ideology. 
This will be discussed further below. First, though, it will be useful to have a brief historical 
overview of industrial relations in NZ, given how the ‘differences among national institutional 
contexts can both hinder and help transnational labo[u]r alliances’ (Brookes, 2013).  
 
 
Industrial Relations in NZ  
Industrial relations in NZ have been marked by four distinctive periods (Geare and Edgar, 
2007: 248): the pre-Arbitration period (1840-1893), the Arbitration era (1883-1987), the 
Collective Bargaining era (1987-1991) and the current Laissez-faire era (1991- …).  
The pre-Arbitration era encompassed the time of first European settlement of NZ, and, at 
least in theory, English law was enforced. This era was ended by the passing of the Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1893 by the NZ Parliament. On the face of it the Conciliation and 
Arbitration era should have been supportive of unions, as it envisaged national level, sectoral 
bargaining, with compulsory arbitration of disputes and, from 1936, compulsory union membership. 
Despite these strong institutional factors, employment relations in NZ became, on the contrary, 
increasingly unitarist and paternalistic. ‘By the time the Labour party became the Government in 
1984 strikes were all either explicitly unlawful, or liable to penalties, arbitration was available as a 
guaranteed ‘back stop and certain issues…were interpreted by the Courts as being managerial 
prerogatives and hence not negotiable under law’ (Geare and Edgar, 2007: 299). 
The Labour Relations Act 1987 was the fourth Labour government’s only labour market 
reform, during a period (1984-1990) in which they radically restructured the rest of the NZ 
economy with a programme of market liberalisation policies and privatisations. Prior to the election 
of the fourth Labour Government in 1984 the NZ economy was subject to high levels of 
government intervention and regulation (Gustafson, 2006: 8) and was ‘arguably the most controlled 
in the Western world’ (Gustafson, 2006: 9). 
The 1987 Act, which marks the move to the short-lived Collective Bargaining era, made 
strikes lawful in certain circumstances, did not accept that some issues were managerial prerogatives 
and encouraged unionism and collective bargaining. What was retained from the previous era was a 
system of regional and national awards, blanket provisions extending those awards to all employers 
in the region or country, and compulsory membership of unions. This Act can be seen in contrast to 
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the rest of the Labour government’s de-regulatory reforms in its continuing support for union 
membership and collective bargaining. It may be argued that this was due to the political 
dependence of the Labour party on the labour movement, and the trade unions. The party itself was 
founded in 1916 ‘to be the political wing of the industrial labour movement’ (Aimer, 2006: 356), 
and a hallmark of the organisation is the affiliation of trade unions (Aimer, 2006: 359). Alternatively, 
however, from the point of view of the NZ trade unionist this was the first major reform of 
industrial relations since 1893. The move away from the award system towards collective bargaining 
may be seen as undermining, rather than supporting, trade unionism in that context.  
The general election of 1990 brought a change to a National-led government and the start of 
the ongoing neo-liberal era. Their 1991 Employment Contracts Act (ECA) swept away any 
legislative support for collective bargaining and trade unions, and has been described as having 
shifted NZ from one of the most highly regulated to one of the most liberalised labour market 
regimes in the industrialised world (Haynes, 2005: 259). The Act recognised only the employer and 
employee as parties to the employment relationship, which was to be regulated purely by contract 
negotiated between the parties. There are suggestions in the purpose of the Act that employers and 
employees can negotiate whether employment contracts are individual, or collective, or both; but 
there is no mention of 'unions' in the Act at all. The references are instead to ‘employee 
organisations’.  
In 1991, at the introduction of the ECA, union density was 35.4%. By December 1998 this 
had fallen to 17.7% (Geare and Edgar, 2007: 321) and to 17.1% by December 1999.7 What was 
established, in fact if not in rhetoric, was freedom and flexibility for employers, with none of the 
recognition of the lower bargaining power of workers, and indeed an assumption of equality of 
bargaining power.  
In their reaction to the ECA 1991 the focus of trade unions in NZ remained almost 
exclusively on collective bargaining, producing an increasing reliance on a shrinking group of core 
workers for leadership and a further reliance on legislative protections. Given the nature of trade 
union strategies, and their assumptions about labour, this is not a major difference from unions in 
other countries in their reactions to the crisis. The more restrictive focus on collective bargaining of 
unions until 1991 in NZ, however, has, it seems, narrowed the possible avenues for action without a 
radical change in policy. Indeed, the wish of NZ Equity to represent members for whom there are 
no formal collective bargaining structures runs contrary to this general trend.  
The return to power of Labour in 1999, under the leadership of Helen Clark, brought with 
it a new legislative framework for industrial relations. The Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA) 
was intended to bring the concept of ‘good faith’ to NZ employment law and also boost support for 
collective bargaining and trade unions, as opposed to the ECA, whose purpose was ‘to promote an 
efficient labour market’ (ECA, 1991). Despite these intentions, while there was a small increase in 
union membership and collective bargaining coverage between 2000 and 2005, these numbers have 
remained static.  
 
 
The Role of Ideology  
Wilson (2010) has described modern NZ industrial relations as a ‘struggle between 
competing ideologies’ in that the key features of the statutory framework have shifted dramatically, 
even without a broad based political consensus underlying the changes. Indeed, the new leadership 
of the NZ Labour Party has signalled that a new legislative framework for industrial relations will be 
one of their priorities if they lead the Government after the 2014 election (to be held on 20 
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September). This may allow for a boost for unions in the short term, but it is not necessarily a long 
term solution to the crisis.  
While Wilson saw no broad based political consensus underlying the legislative changes 
between 1991 and 2010, others have argued that there are, on the contrary, emerging themes in NZ 
society which could be described as broadly embracing a ‘neo-liberal’ outlook (Bogg et al., 2013). As 
the Labour Minister responsible for the ERA 2000, it might be that Wilson does see a bigger 
difference in ideology between that Act and the ECA 1991 than others looking in from the outside. 
These themes identified by Bogg et al., and noted above, are a combination of a) de-
regulation in all markets, including the labour market, b) as part of a strategy of economic 
competition, c) together with a roll back of the role of the State from one of promoting the 
representative role of trade unions to one of neutrality. This last is too cautious a description, 
however, given the intervention of the Government in this dispute. It seems more that the role of 
the state has been recast as one representative of capital as opposed to neutrality, while retaining an 
image of neutrality through the conflation of the ‘public good’ with the attraction of inward 
investment. The National-led Government has proposed changes to employment legislation at vari-
ous times since the 2008 election. These proposals have always been described as neutral, even-
handed attempts to ‘“re-balance” the power between employers and workers (Employment Rela-
tions Amendment Bill 2013, preamble). The real effects, however, of the changes will be to negate 
the power of organised labour in NZ.’8 In particular changes to the legal foundations of collective 
bargaining contained in the Employment Relations Amendment Bill 2013, including the removal of 
the requirement for bargaining to be concluded, are viewed as likely to remove any enforceable 
requirement for employers to bargain with unions.  
As Bogg et al. (2013) point out, in its public narration of events surrounding the Hobbit 
dispute, the Key government conflated the common good with the attraction of inward investment 
through de-regulation of the labour market. These ideologies could be described as gaining 
‘hegemonic’ status in NZ in the sense of becoming ‘the common sense of a whole social order’ 
(Eagleton, 2011). That this appeared to be accepted as ‘common sense’ by the bulk of the 
mainstream press, and by the bulk of NZ voters cannot be denied. This ideological outlook most 
certainly pits union members as outsiders in society, and at its most extreme, as a potential threat to 
the economy, and so to the social order.  
In this regard, the affiliation of NZ Equity to MEAA can only be seen to have negatively 
impacted on the power of the unions. ‘While the need for strong support and the traditional 
international collaboration in a global industry centred elsewhere might have made affiliation with 
the MEAA seem an attractive prospect for NZ Equity, it was probably a strategic mistake’ 
(McAndrew & Risak, 2012: 72). Not only could the unions be framed as outsiders to the Kiwi 
social order, threatening the national economy in general, and the future of the film industry, the 
MEAA affiliation meant they could be seen as true, Australian outsiders.  
 
 
The Transational Nature of the Alliance 
In her survey of the academic literature on transnational labour alliances Brookes (2013) 
states that the picture is complicated. ‘No single snapshot could capture the extensive array of 
tactics workers utilize in transnational campaigns’ (Brookes, 2013: 182). It may be useful here, 
however, to distinguish between two different types of transnational alliance which were involved in 
this dispute. There was both a strategic, ongoing trans-Tasman alliance between the NZ Equity 
union and the MEAA, and a tactical, dispute based alliance with the MEAA and the FIA. The first, 
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the ongoing relationship between NZ Equity and the MEAA, is perhaps more akin to the type of 
trade union merger or amalgamation that has been common, within national borders, since the early 
1990s. Given the size of the NZ population generally, and the number of professional actors in 
particular, it is a sensible strategy to make use of a close relationship with a bigger, better resourced 
and so stronger union, in the same industry based in a close trading partner. Munck (2014: 299) 
indeed comments that in other contexts ‘[i]ncreasingly unions are establishing bi-lateral relations 
with sister organisations in other countries…’ He cites the examples of the Dutch and British 
maritime sector unions merger in 2009 to form Nautilus as an example of such a sectoral, cross 
border partnership. Munck’s other example of the merger of the UK and Ireland’s biggest union, 
Unite, with the US and Canada’s United Steelworkers is of a different type given the sheer size of 
the membership of the enlarged organisation, added to the complexities involved with the 
widespread natures of the sectors covered.  
The dispute based alliance with the FIA perhaps is a better illustration of the type of 
transnational alliances that Brookes discusses, though what both have in common is that they are 
‘instances of active co-operation across national borders between two or more unions or other 
organised groups of workers’ (Brooks, 2013: 182). 
Brookes (2013) identifies three distinct types of power which can be exercised by labour in 
transnational alliances; structural, institutional and coalitional power. Structural power is the ability 
of workers to influence employers because of their location in the economic system (Brookes, 2013: 
183). This type of power is not necessarily confined to the national economy but can also be 
exercised at a global level. Institutional power comes from the ability of workers in one country to 
use their more advantageous institutional position to support less privileged workers in another 
country (Brookes, 2013: 187). Finally, coalitional power is the use of networks of social relations to 
expand the scope of conflict by involving other, non-labour actors willing and able to influence an 
employer’s behaviour (Brookes, 2013: 192).  
 The strategic decision to exercise any or all of these types of power will depend upon the 
nature of the dispute, the nature of the employer’s business, the knowledge the union has about the 
nature of the employer’s business and the inter-dependence between the workers and the employer 
in each case. In the case of this dispute, it could be argued that while the unions successfully used 
both structural and institutional power, the overall outcome might best be explained by the success 
of the employers’ exercise of coalitional power.  
In relation to the idea of structural power, Brookes suggests that there are two types – 
marketplace bargaining and workplace bargaining power. Workplace bargaining is the most 
common in transnational labour alliances, in particular where workers are bound up in tight, 
interconnected production and supply chains.  
With regard to marketplace bargaining, this is conceived as the ability of workers to 
influence a particular employer by withdrawing their labour from the marketplace and surviving on 
non-labour sources of income. While this is acknowledged to be rarely encountered in transnational 
labour alliances, the nature of the global film industry, with workers being engaged on a project basis 
for each production, means that this may be the best way of describing what was being attempted 
through the ‘Do not sign’ order. While the actors were not withdrawing their labour completely 
from the marketplace, they were withdrawing from this particular production, but with the 
possiblity to survive on income from other projects. This type of action, having the possibility of 
delaying or stopping a single production altogether without preventing the actors finding other 
sources of income and work, is an extremely powerful tool.  
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There were also additional pressures on this particular production, over and above the 
financial issues being experienced in the industry on the back of the global financial crisis (Haworth, 
2012: 101). In particular The Hobbit had been in various stages of pre-production for around six 
years, while personnel changed and other problems beset it. A delay in beginning filming due to a 
global industrial dispute at this late stage was an addition unlikely to be welcomed by all those 
involved (Handel, 2012).  
In addition to their structural power simply as actors per se, the FIA used the international 
nature of the putative cast for the movie as a further part of their strategy to influence SPADA in 
NZ. If all the actors, not just NZ actors, would only engage with the production once an agreement 
on bargaining had been reached, it should be a strategic decision for Warner Brothers, as the main 
investor, to influence SPADA to come to that agreement. Further, while the rhetoric around the 
uncertainty of filming in NZ was based on the idea that when Warner Brothers moved production 
overseas the putatively ongoing dispute would be over, this was a global action – the same actors, 
including the big name US and British actors in concert with the NZ actors may well have 
continued to refuse to engage with the production, no matter where it was located geographically.  
With regard to the institutional power employed by the unions through the FIA, actors in 
most other English speaking economies have solidly recognised rights to minimum contract terms 
and conditions, collectively bargained by their unions – in the United Kingdom (UK) by Equity, in 
Australia by the affiliated union the MEAA and, most influentially, in the United States of America 
(USA) by SAG. SAG’s constitution states that ‘No member shall work as a performer or make an 
agreement to work as a performer for any producer who has not executed a basic minimum 
agreement with the Guild which is in full force and effect.’9 Until 1 May 2002, this rule was only 
enforced on productions shot in the United States, however since that date, what is referred to as 
Global Rule One extends to all members working outside the US for foreign producers as well. This 
means that any producer wishing to engage a member of SAG as a performer in their film/TV 
show/commercial or industrial production, no matter where in the world it is to be filmed, must 
‘become signatory to a Screen Actors Guild Global Rule One agreement, providing for minimum 
wages, working conditions and protections for each such member.’10 
The global action by the FIA can therefore be seen as a clear example of workers from the 
other English speaking countries using their better terms and conditions, and strong collective 
bargaining influence, to try to force the film industry in NZ to improve the relatively weak position 
of NZ workers. In a country where only 17.4% of the labour force belongs to a trade union such 
international solidarity seems to be a viable option for building support, and leverage for campaigns 
for labour rights.11 As has been noted ‘...Warner Bros strategists had little to fear from an 
organisation of several hundred NZ actors’ (McAndrew & Risak, 2012: 72).  
As Brookes points out, however much an alliance of unions and workers can select their 
strategy for each action based on their own understanding of the institutional and structural 
background, ‘labour cannot control the political and economic context in which a transnational 
campaign plays out’ (Brookes, 2013: 196). 
 
 
Coalitional Power in Opposition  
The third distinct type of power identified by Brookes is that of coalitional power, or the use 
of networks of social relations to expand the scope of conflict by involving other, non-labour actors 
willing and able to influence an employer’s behaviour (Brookes, 2013: 192). As the FIA’s ‘Do not 
sign’ order was not publicised and only notified directly to the production companies involved, it 
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seems that the federation had made the strategic decision that their structural and institutional 
power would be sufficient in this context. Indeed, it might be difficult for actors to garner non-
labour support for industrial action, due to their perceived position as relatively wealthy, 
transnational workers. As Kelly discusses (1997: 29) social movement theorists have articulated that 
there are three critical processes through which groups go before taking collective action: attribution, 
social identification and leadership. Even if a wider social grouping than actors were to see their 
grievances as genuine, and subsequently attribute the blame for those grievances to SPADA, it may 
be impossible to have the requisite number of that wider social group also identify with film actors. 
In particular due to the perception of actors as being Hollywood stars with a ‘jet set’ lifestyle.  
In the context of the global film production industry, therefore, the labour alliance built 
around the FIA using the actors’ economic and industrial location as structural and institutional 
power would theoretically, and did in fact, lead to success. But what overshadowed the success in 
gaining an agreement to re-negotiate minimum terms and conditions in return for the lifting of the 
‘Do not sign’ order has much deeper and longer lasting consequences of NZ industrial relations, and 
perhaps says more about the society than this one particular incident.  
In any dispute, the employers also have an opportunity in which to exercise their own 
respective structural, institutional and coalitional power to resist labour actions. Brookes describes 
how workers can leverage the influence of ‘consumers, voters, shareholders, journalists, political 
leaders and various other actors with the potential to influence the outcome of conflicts between 
capital and labo[u]r’ (Brookes, 2013: 191). In this case, in spite of the dispute being over, and 
industrial action lifted, it was the employer who brought to bear leverage from all these sectors to 
craft an opportunity for the forces of capital to achieve both the de-regulation of the film production 
labour market, in the passing of the Employment Relations (Film Production) (Amendment) Act 
2010, and additional tax subsidies attached to the production of the film. Between the 17 October 
2010, when the dispute was settled, and the exit from NZ of the Warner Brothers executives, the 
unions had no ongoing dispute, and their choice to delay the announcement of this until Warner 
Brothers agreed to do so turns out to have been an error. This error let the later confirmation of the 
CTU (along with SAG and the FIA) appear to be in response to the Warner Brothers’ threat to 
move the production offshore, and allowed the 20 October 2010 demonstration at Weta 
Workshops to appear to be a reaction to the industrial action, rather than a well-crafted tactic on 
the part of the capital investors and employers to turn the situation to their advantage. In the 
context of the hegemonic nature of neoliberal ideas in NZ, as discussed above, turning this union 




While in the long run it might seem, at best, over-optimistic to claim the FIA’s transnational 
action around the production of the The Hobbit was a successful one, it remains the case that 
SPADA and NZ Actors’ Equity entered into negotiations to update the NZ actors’ minimum terms 
and conditions as had been sought by the unions. In light, however, of the overshadowing of this 
success by the de-regulatory legislation and further tax subsidies to the foreign investors, the 
conclusion must be reached that overall this was to the detriment of the trade union movement, if 
not in global terms, at least within NZ. 
The fact that the NZ public was so ready and willing to accept Peter Jackson as one of their 
own, acting on their behalf, rather than as a capital investor and employer, is a contributing factor to 
the other ideological issues at play. In addition, the emergence of the neo-liberal ideals of attracting 
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inward investment through competition and labour market de-regulation are attaining something of 
a hegemonic status. The combination of these two factors allowed the Government to intervene in 
an apparent attempt to broker a deal between the unions and capital, ostensibly as a neutral 
bystander. In reality, its role was far from neutral; it was actively and exclusively engaging with 
Warner Brothers’ executives on their visit to NZ, and directly negotiating the terms of the 
agreement with them to conclude a dispute which no longer, as they knew, existed.  
If there are lessons to be learned by unions from this very brief, but turbulent period it may 
be that the exercise of structural and institutional power is no longer sufficient to offset the power of 
capital. In a society where trade unions, and labour, have seemed to have lost their legitimacy as 
actors at a national level, and the role of counter-weight to capital investment is no longer seen as 
expedient or indeed wise, there is a further need to use whatever coalitional power, at a national 
level, is available. NZ Actors’ Equity’s alliance with MEAA is a type of cross-border partnership 
which is becoming common, but this was used to great effect by Peter Jackson and the NZ 
Government in framing the issue in the minds of the general public. There must therefore be a 
harnessing of power to narrow or exclude the options for capital to use their own coalitional power 
to depict the unions as separate to the workers, and therefore as the outsider and threat to the 
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